000			01525nab a2200181 4500
005			20260520000812.0
008			260224s2008 xxu
100	1		_aBjertnaes, Geir H. _940744
245	0	0	_aDesigning an electricity tax system in presence of international regulations and multiple public goals _bAn ampirical assessment
260			_cOct. 2008
270			_a2009-04-07 ; 2009-04-07
300			_a11 p. ; 3723-3733
520			_aTranscripción del resumen publicado por el autor: The European competition rules restrict governments' opportunity to differentiate terms of energy accessibility among firms and industries. This easily runs counter with regional and industrial goals of national energy policies. Norway levies a tax on use of electricity, but exempts main industrial usages. This analysis assesses alternative, internationally legal, designs of the system in terms of their effects on efficiency and distribution, including industrial objectives. Among the reforms we explore, removing the exemptions would be the most effective way of raising revenue, but it would be politically costly by deteriorating the competitiveness of today's favoured industries. An entire abolishment of the electricity tax, and replacing revenue by increased VAT, would generate a more equal distribution of standard of living and, at the same time, avoid the trade-off between efficiency and competitiveness
581			_a10
773	0		_tEnergy Policy _g36
942			_cARTICULO
999			_c169469 _d169469