000			01824nab a2200181 4500
005			20260520000812.0
008			260224s2008 xxu
100	1		_aWalawalkar, Rahul _940733
245	0	0	_aAn economic welfare analysis of demand response in the PJM electricity market
260			_cOct. 2008
270			_a2009-04-06 ; 2009-04-06
300			_a11 p. ; 3692-3702
520			_aTranscripción del resumen publicado por el autor: We analyze the economic properties of the economic demand-response (DR) program in the PJM electricity market in the United States using DR market data. PJM's program provided subsidies to customers who reduced load in response to price signals. The program incorporated a "trigger point", at a locational marginal price of $75/MWh, at or beyond which payments for load reduction included a subsidy payment. Particularly during peak hours, such a program saves money for the system, but the subsidies involved introduce distortions into the market. We simulate demand-side bidding into the PJM market, and compare the social welfare gains with the subsidies paid to price-responsive load using load and price data for year 2006. The largest economic effect is wealth transfers from generators to non price-responsive loads. Based on the incentive payment structure that was in effect through the end of 2007, we estimate that the social welfare gains exceed the distortions introduced by the subsidies. Lowering the trigger point increases the transfer from generators to consumers, but may result in the subsidy outweighing the social welfare gains due to load curtailment. We estimate that the socially optimal range for the incentive trigger point would be $66-77/MWh
581			_a10
773	0		_tEnergy Policy _g36
942			_cARTICULO
999			_c169462 _d169462